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1 Introduction
Craig Callender and Nick Huggett
In recent years it has sometimes been difficult to distinguish between articles in
quantum gravity journals and articles in philosophy journals. It is not uncommon
for physics journals such as Physical Review D, General Relativity and Gravitation
and others to contain discussion of philosophers such as Parmenides, Aristotle,
Leibniz, and Reichenbach; meanwhile, Philosophy of Science, British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science and others now contain papers on the emergence of spacetime,
the problem of time in quantum gravity, the meaning of general covariance, etc. At
various academic conferences on quantum gravity one often finds philosophers at
physicists’ gatherings and physicists at philosophers’ gatherings. While we exaggerate
a little, there is in recent years a definite trend of increased communication (even
collaboration) between physicists working in quantum gravity and philosophers of
science. What explains this trend?
Part of the reason for the connection between these two fields is no doubt negative:
to date, there is no recognized experimental evidence of characteristically quantum
gravitational effects. As a consequence, physicists building a theory of quantum
gravity are left without direct guidance from empirical findings. In attempting to
build such a theory almost from first principles it is not surprising that physicists
should turn to theoretical issues overlapping those studied by philosophers.
But there is also a more positive reason for the connection between quantum
gravity and philosophy: many of the issues arising in quantum gravity are genuinely
philosophical in nature. Since quantum gravity forces us to challenge some of our
deepest assumptions about the physical world, all the different approaches to the
subject broach questions discussed by philosophers. How should we understand
general relativity’s general covariance – is it a significant physical principle, or is it
merely a question about the language with which one writes an equation? What is
the nature of time and change? Can there be a theory of the universe’s boundary
conditions? Must space and time be fundamental? And so on. Physicists thinking
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about these issues have noticed that philosophers have investigated each of them.
(Philosophers have discussed the first question for roughly 20 years; the others for
at least 2,500 years.) Not surprisingly, then, some physicists have turned to the
work of classic and contemporary philosophers to see what they have been saying
about time, space, motion, change and so on. Some philosophers, noticing this
work, have responded by studying quantum gravity. They have diverse motives:
some hope that their logical skills and acquaintance with such topics may serve the
physicists in their quest for a theory of quantum gravity; others hope that work in
the field may shed some light on these ancient questions, in the way that modern
physics has greatly clarified other traditional areas of metaphysics, and still others
think of quantum gravity as an intriguing ‘case study’ of scientific discovery in
practice. In all these regards, it is interesting to note that Rovelli (1997) explicitly
and positively draws a parallel between the current interaction between physics and
philosophy and that which accompanied the scientific revolution, from Galileo to
Newton.
This volume explores some of the areas that philosophers and physicists have in
common with respect to quantum gravity. It brings together some of the leading
thinkers in contemporary physics and philosophy of science to introduce and discuss
philosophical issues in the foundations of quantum gravity. In the remainder of this
introduction we aim to sketch an outline of the field, introducing the basic physical
ideas to philosophers, and introducing philosophical background for physicists. We
are especially concerned with the questions: Why should there be a quantum theory
of gravity? What are the leading approaches? And what issues might constitute the
overlap between quantum gravity and philosophy?
More specifically, the plan of the Introduction is as follows. Section 1.1 sets
the stage for the volume by briefly considering why one might want a quantum
theory of gravity in the first place. Section 1.2 is more substantive, for it tackles the
question of whether the gravitational field must be quantized. One often hears the
idea that it is actually inconsistent with known physics to have a world wherein
the gravitational field exists unquantized. But is this right? Section 1.2.1 considers
an interesting argument which claims that if the world exists in a half-quantized
and half-unquantized form, then either superluminal signalling will be allowed or
energy–momentum will not be conserved. Section 1.2.2 then takes up the idea of
so-called ‘semiclassical’ quantum gravity. We show that the arguments for quantizing
gravity are not conclusive, but that the alternative is not particularly promising either.
We feel that it is important to address this issue so that readers will understand how
one is led to consider the kind of theories – with their extraordinary conceptual
difficulties – discussed in the book. However, those not interested in pursuing this
issue immediately are invited to skip ahead to Section 1.3, which outlines (and
hints at some conceptual problems with) the two main theories of quantum gravity,
superstring theory and canonical quantum gravity. Finally, Section 1.4 turns to the
question of what quantum gravity and philosophy have to say to each other. Here,
we discuss in the context of the papers in the volume many of the issues where
philosophers and physicists have interests that overlap in quantum gravity.
A word to the wise before we begin. Because this is a book concerned
with the philosophical dimensions of quantum gravity, our contributors stress
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philosophical discussion over accounts of state-of-the-art technical developments in
physics: especially, loop quantum gravity and M-theory are treated only in passing
(see Rovelli 1998 and Witten 1997 for reviews, and Major 1999 for a very accesible
formal introduction). Aside from sheer constraints on space, the reasons for this
emphasis are two-fold: First, developments at the leading edge of the field occur
very fast and do not always endure; and second, the central philosophical themes
in the field can (to a large extent) be understood and motivated by consideration of
the core parts of the theory that have survived subsequent developments. We have
thus aimed to provide an introduction to the philosophy of quantum gravity that
will retain its relevance as the field evolves: hopefully, as answers are worked out, the
papers here will still raise the important questions and outline their possible solu-
tions. But the reader should be aware that there will have been important advances
in the physics that are not reflected in this volume: we invite them to learn here what
issues are philosophically interesting about quantum gravity, and then discover for
themselves how more recent developments in physics relate to those issues.
1.1 Why quantum gravity?
We should emphasize at the outset that currently there is no quantum theory of
gravity in the sense that there is, say, a quantum theory of gauge fields. ‘Quantum
gravity’ is merely a placeholder for whatever theory or theories eventually manage
to bring together our theory of the very small, quantum mechanics, with our theory
of the very large, general relativity. This absence of a theory might be thought
to present something of an impediment to a book supposedly on its foundations.
However, there do exist many more-or-less developed approaches to the task –
especially superstring theory and canonical quantum gravity (see Section 1.3) – and
the assumptions of these theories and the difficulties they share can be profitably
studied from a variety of philosophical perspectives.
First, though, a few words about why we ought to expect there to be a theory of
quantum gravity. Since we have no unequivocal experimental evidence conflicting
with either general relativity or quantum mechanics, do we really need a quan-
tum theory of gravitation? Why can’t we just leave well enough alone, as some
philosophical approaches to scientific theories seem to suggest?
It might be thought that ‘instrumentalists’ are able to ignore quantum gravity.
Instrumentalism, as commonly understood, conceives of scientific theories merely
as tools for prediction. Scientific theories, on this view, are not (or ought not to be)
in the business of providing an accurate picture of reality in any deeper sense. Since
there are currently no observations demanding a quantum gravitational theory, it
might be thought that advocates of such a position would view the endeavour as
empty and misguided speculation, perhaps of formal interest, but with no physical
relevance.
However, while certain thinkers may indeed feel this way, we don’t think that
instrumentalists can safely ignore quantum gravity. It would be unwise for them to
construe instrumentalism so narrowly as to make it unnecessary. The reason is that
some of the approaches to the field may well be testable in the near future. The work
that won first prize in the 1999 Gravity Research Foundation Essay Competition,
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for instance, sketches how both photons from distant astrophysical sources and
laboratory experiments on neutral kaon decays may be sensitive to quantum gravi-
tational effects (Ellis et al. 1999). And Kane (1997) explains how possible predictions
of superstring theory – if only the theory was sufficiently tractable for them to be
made – could be tested with currently available technologies. We will never observe
the effects of gravitational interactions between an electron and a proton in a hydro-
gen atom (Feynman 1995, p. 11, calculates that such interaction would change the
wave function phase by a tiny 43 arcseconds in 100T , where T is the age of the
universe!), but other effects may be directly or indirectly observable, perhaps given
relatively small theoretical or experimental advances. Presumably, instrumentalists
will want physics to be empirically adequate with respect to these phenomena. (We
might also add the common observation that since one often doesn’t know what is
observable until a theory is constructed, even an instrumentalist should not restrict
the scope of new theories to extant evidence.)
Another philosophical position, which we might dub the ‘disunified physics’ view
might in this context claim that general relativity describes certain aspects of the
world, quantum mechanics other distinct aspects, and that would be that. According
to this view, physics (and indeed, science) need not offer a single universal theory
encompassing all physical phenomena. We shall not debate the correctness of this
view here, but we would like to point out that if physics aspires to provide a complete
account of the world, as it traditionally has, then there must be a quantum theory of
gravity. The simple reason is that general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot
both be correct even in their domains of applicability.
First, general relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be universal in
scope, for the latter strictly predicts that all matter is quantum, and the former only
describes the gravitational effects of classical matter: they cannot both take the whole
(physical) world as their domain of applicability. But neither is the world split neatly
into systems appropriately described by one and systems appropriately described
by the other. For the majority of situations treated by physics, such as electrons
or planets, one can indeed get by admirably using only one of these theories: for
example, the gravitational effects of a hydrogen nucleus on an electron are negligible,
as we noted above, and the quantum spreading of the wavepacket representing
Mercury won’t much affect its orbit. But in principle, the two theories govern the
same systems: we cannot think of the world as divided in two, with matter fields
governed by quantum mechanics evolving on a curved spacetime manifold, itself
governed by general relativity. This is, of course, because general relativity, and in
particular, the Einstein field equation
Gµν = 8πTµν , (1.1)
couples the matter–energy fields in the form of the stress–energy tensor, Tµν , with
the spacetime geometry, in the form of the Einstein tensor, Gµν . Quantum fields
carry energy and mass; therefore, if general relativity is true, quantum fields distort
the curvature of spacetime and the curvature of spacetime affects the motion of
the quantum fields. If these theories are to yield a complete account of physical
phenomena, there will be no way to avoid those situations – involving very high
energies – in which there are non-negligible interactions between the quantum
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and gravitational fields; yet we do not have a theory characterizing this interaction.
Indeed, the influence of gravity on the quantum realm is an experimental fact: Peters
et al. (1999) measured interference between entangled systems following different
paths in the Earth’s gravitational field to measure gravitational acceleration to three
parts in 109. Further, we do not know whether new low energy, non-perturbative,
phenomena might result from a full treatment of the connection between quantum
matter and spacetime. In general, the fact that gravity and quantum matter are
inseparable ‘in principle’ will have in practice consequences, and we are forced to
consider how the theories connect.
One natural reaction is to correct this ‘oversight’ and extend quantummethods to
the gravitational interaction in the way that they were applied to describe the electro-
magnetic and nuclear interactions of matter, yielding the tremendously successful
‘standard model’ of quantum field theory. One way to develop this approach is to
say that the spacetime metric, gµν , be broken into two parts, ηµν + hµν , representing
a flat background spacetime and a gravitational disturbance respectively; and that
we look for a quantum field theory of hµν propagating in a flat spacetime described
by ηµν . However, in contrast to the other known forces, it turns out that all unitary
local quantumfield theories for gravity are non-renormalizable. That is, the coupling
strength parameter has the dimensions of a negative power of mass, and so stan-
dard arguments imply that the divergences that appear in perturbative calculations
of physical quantities cannot be cancelled by rescaling a finite number of physical
parameters: ultimately the theory depends on an infinite number of quantities that
would need to be fixed empirically. More troubling is the strong suggestion from
study of the ‘renormalization group’ that such non-renormalizable theories become
pathological at short distances (e.g. Weinberg 1983) – perhaps not too surprising a
result for a theory which attempts in some sense to ‘quantize distance’.
Thus the approach that worked sowell for the other forces of nature does not seem
applicable to gravity. Some new strategy seems in order if we are to marry quantum
theory and relativity. The different programmes – both the twomain ones, canonical
quantum gravity and superstring theory, and alternatives such as twistor theory,
the holographic hypothesis, non-commutative geometry, topological quantum field
theory, etc. – all explore different avenues of attack. What goes, of course, is the
picture of gravity as just another quantum field on a flat classical spacetime – again,
not too surprising if one considers that there is no proper distinction between gravity
and spacetime in general relativity. But what is to be expected, if gravity will not fit
neatly into our standard quantum picture of the world, is that developing quantum
gravity will require technical and philosophical revolutions in our conceptions of
space and time.
1.2 Must the gravitational field be quantized?
1.2.1 No-go theorems?
Although a theory of quantum gravity may be unavoidable, this does not automati-
cally mean that wemust quantize the classical gravitational field of general relativity.
A theory is clearly needed to characterize systems subject to strong quantum and
gravitational effects, but it does not follow that the correct thing to do is to take
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classical relativistic objects such as the Riemann tensor or metric field and quantize
them: that is, make them operators subject to non-vanishing commutation rela-
tions. All that follows from Section 1.1 is that a new theory is needed – nothing
about the nature of this new theory was assumed. Nevertheless, there are arguments
in the literature to the effect that it is inconsistent to have quantized fields interact
with non-quantized fields: the world cannot be half-quantized-and-half-classical. If
correct, given the (apparent) necessity of quantizing matter fields, it would follow
that we must also quantize the gravitational field. We would like to comment briefly
on this type of argument, for we believe that they are interesting, even if they fall
short of strict no-go theorems for any half-and-half theory of quantum gravity.
We are aware of two different arguments for the necessity of quantizing fields
that interact with quantum matter. One is an argument (e.g. DeWitt 1962) based
on a famous paper by Bohr and Rosenfeld (1933) that analysed a semiclassical
theory of the electromagnetic field in which ‘quantum disturbances’ spread into the
classical field. These papers argue that the quantization of a given system implies the
quantization of any system to which it can be coupled, since the uncertainty relations
of the quantized field ‘infect’ the coupled non-quantized field. Thus, since quantum
matter fields interact with the gravitational field, these arguments, if correct, would
prove that the gravitational field must also be quantized. We will not discuss this
argument here, since Brown and Redhead (1981) contains a sound critique of the
‘disturbance’ view of the uncertainty principle underpinning these arguments.
Interestingly, Rosenfeld (1963) actually denied that the 1933 paper showed any
inconsistency in semiclassical approaches. He felt that empirical evidence, not logic,
forced us to quantize fields; in the absence of such evidence ‘this temptation [to
quantize] must be resisted’ (1963, p. 354). Emphasizing this point, Rosenfeld ends
his paper with the remark, ‘Even the legendary Chicago machine cannot deliver
sausages if it is not supplied with hogs’ (1963, p. 356). This encapsulates the point
of view we would like to defend here.
The second argument, which we will consider, is due to Eppley and Hannah (1977)
(but see also Page and Geilker 1981 and Unruh 1984). The argument – modified
in places by us – goes like this. Suppose that the gravitational field were relativistic
(Lorentzian) and classical: not quantized, not subject to uncertainty relations, and
not allowing gravitational states to superpose in a way that makes the classical field
indeterminate. The contrast is exactly like that between a classical and quantum
particle.1 Let us also momentarily assume the standard interpretation of quantum
mechanics, whereby a measurement interaction instantaneously collapses the wave
function into an eigenstate of the relevant observable. (See, for example Aharonov
and Albert 1981, for a discussion of the plausibility of this interpretation in the
relativistic context.)
Now we ask how this classical field interacts with quantized matter, for the
moment keeping all possibilities on the table. Eppley and Hannah (1977) see two
(supposedly) exhaustive cases: gravitational interactions either collapse or do not
collapse quantum states.
Take the first horn of the dilemma: suppose the gravitational field does not collapse
the quantum state of a piece of matter with which it interacts. Then we can send
superluminal signals, in violation of relativity, as conventionally understood. Eppley
6
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and Hannah (1977) (and Pearle and Squires 1996) suggest some simple ways in
which this can be accomplished using a pair of entangled particles, but we will use
a modification of Einstein’s ‘electron in a box’ thought experiment. However, the
key to these examples is the (seemingly unavoidable) claim that if a gravitational
interaction does not collapse a quantum state, then the dynamics of the interaction
depend on the state. In particular, the way a classical gravitational wave scatters off
a quantum object would depend on the spatial wave function of the object, much as
it would depend on a classical mass distribution. Thus, scattering experiments are at
least sensitive to changes in the wave function, and at best will allow one to determine
the form of the wave function – without collapsing it. It is not hard to see how this
postulate, together with the usual interpretation of quantum measurements, allows
superluminal signalling.
We start with a rectangular box containing a single electron (or perhaps a micro-
scopic black hole), in a quantum state that makes it equally likely that the electron
will be found in either half of the box. We then introduce a barrier between the two
halves and separate them, leaving the electron in a superposition of states corre-
sponding to being in the left box and being in the right box. If the probabilities of
being in each box are equal, then the state of the particle will be:
ψ(x) = 1/
√
2(ψL(x) + ψR(x)), (1.2)
where ψL(x) and ψR(x) are wave functions of identical shape but with supports
inside the left and right boxes respectively.
Next we give the boxes to two friends Lefty and Righty, who carry them far apart
(without ever looking in them of course). In Einstein’s original version (in a letter
discussed by Fine 1986, p. 35–39, which is a clarification of the EPR argument in its
published form), when Lefty looked inside her box – and say found it empty – an
element of reality was instantaneously present in Righty’s box – the presence of the
electron – even though the boxes were spacelike separated. Assuming the collapse
postulate, when Lefty looks in her box a state transition,
1/
√
2(ψL(x) + ψR(x)) → ψR(x) (1.3)
occurs. In the familiar way, either some kind of spooky non-local ‘action’ occurs or
the electron was always in Righty’s box and quantum mechanics is incomplete, since
ψ(x) is indeterminate between the boxes. Of course, this experiment does not allow
signalling, for if Righty now looks in his box and sees the electron, he could just as
well conclude that he was the first to look in the box, collapsing the superposition.
And the long run statistics generated by repeated measurements that Righty observes
will be 50 : 50, electron : empty, whatever Lefty does – they can only determine the
correlation by examining the joint probability distribution, to which Righty, at his
wing, does not have access.
In the present case the situation is far more dire, for Righty can use our non-
collapsing gravitational field to ‘see’ what the wave function in his box is without
collapsing it. We simply imagine that the right-hand box is equipped with apertures
that allow gravitational waves in and out, and that Righty arranges a gravitational
wave source at one of them and detectors at the others.2
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Since the scattering depends on the form of the wave function in the box, any
changes in the wave function will show up as changes in the scattering pattern reg-
istered by the detectors. Hence, when Lefty now looks in her box – and suppose this
time she finds the electron – Righty’s apparatus will register the collapse instanta-
neously; there will be no scattering source at all, and the waves will pass straight
through Righty’s box. That is, before Lefty looks, the electron wave function is ψ(x)
and Righty’s gravity wave scatters off ψR(x); after Lefty collapses the electron, its
state isψL(x) + 0 and so Righty’s gravity wave has no scattering source. And since we
make the usual assumption that the collapse is instantaneous, the effect of looking
in the left box is registered on the right box superluminally. So, if Righty and Lefty
have a prior agreement that if Lefty performs the measurement then she fancies
a drink after work, otherwise she wants to go to the movies, then the apparatus
provides Righty with information about Lefty’s intentions at a spacelike separated
location.3
It is crucial to understand that this experiment is not a variant of ‘Wigner’s friend’.
One should absolutely not think that scattering the gravity wave off the electron
wave function leads to an entangled state in which the gravity wave is in a quantum
superposition, which is itself collapsed when measured by the detectors, producing
a consequent collapse in the electron wave function. Of course, such things might
occur in a theory of quantum gravity, but they cannot occur in the kind of theory that
we are presently discussing: a theory with a classical gravitational field, which just
means a theory in which there are no quantum superpositions of the gravitational
field. There is in this theory no way of avoiding signalling by introducing quantum
collapses of the gravitational field, since there is nothing to collapse.
It is also important to see how the argument depends on the interpretation of
quantum mechanics. On the one hand it does not strictly require the standard
interpretation of quantum mechanics, but can be made somewhat more general.
In our example, the component of the wave function with support on Righty’s box
went from ψR(x) to 0, which is a very sharp change. But the argument doesn’t need
a sharp change, it just needs a detectable change, to ψR(x), say. On the other hand,
it is necessary for the argument that normal measurements can produce effects at
spacelike separated regions. For then the gravitational waves provide an abnormal
way of watching a wave function without collapsing it, to see when such effects
occur. Thus, an interpretation of quantum mechanics that admits a dynamics which
prevents superluminal propagation of any disturbance in the wave function will
escape this argument. Any no-collapse theory whose wave function is governed at
all times by a relativistic wave equation will be of this type.
The conclusion of this horn of the dilemma is then the following. If one adopts
the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, and one claims that the world is
divided into classical (gravitational) and quantum (matter) parts, and one models
quantum–classical interactions without collapse, then one must accept the possibil-
ity of superluminal signalling. And further, though practical difficulties may prevent
one from ever building a useful signalling device, the usual understanding of relativ-
ity prohibits superluminal signalling, even in principle. Of course, this interpretation
of relativity is a subtle matter in a number of ways, for instance concerning the pos-
sibility of Lorentz-invariant signalling (Maudlin 1994) and even the possibility of
8
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time travel (see, e.g. Earman 1995a). And of course, given the practical difficulty
of performing such an experiment, we do not have definitive empirical grounds for
ruling out such signalling. But since the kind of signalling described here could pick
out a preferred foliation of spacetime – on which the collapse occurs – it does violate
relativity in an important sense. Thus, someone who advocates a standard interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, a half-and-half view of the world and a no-collapse
theory of classical–quantum interactions must deny relativity as commonly under-
stood. They would need a very different theory that could accommodate the kind of
superluminal signalling demonstrated, but that also approximates the causal struc-
ture of general relativity in all the extant experiments. (Note that this conclusion
is in line with our earlier, more general, argument for the existence of a theory of
quantum gravity; and note that the present argument really only demonstrates the
need for a new theory – it does not show that quantizing the metric field is the only
way to escape this problem.)
Of course, as mentioned, one might be able to avoid this horn of the dilemma
by opting for a no-collapse interpretation of quantum mechanics, e.g. some version
of Bohmian mechanics, or Everettian theories. We are not aware of any actual pro-
posal for a half-and-half world that exploits this possibility (e.g. Bohmian quantum
gravity – see below – aims to quantize the gravitational field). But the space may
exist in the logical geography. In Bohm’s theory, however measurements can have
non-local effects on particle positions. Signalling could therefore occur if scattering
at the gravitational field depended on the particle configuration and not only the
wave function.
Let’s turn to the other horn of the dilemma, where now we suppose that grav-
itational interactions can collapse quantum states of matter. Interestingly enough,
there are a number of concrete suggestions that gravity should be thus implicated in
the measurement problem, so it is perhaps not too surprising that attempts to close
off this horn are, if anything, even less secure.
Eppley and Hannah’s (1977) argument against a collapsing half-and-half theory
is that it entails a violation of energy–momentum conservation. First, we assume
that when our classical gravitational wave scatters off a quantum particle its wave
function collapses, to a narrow Gaussian say. Second, we assume that the gravity wave
scatters off the collapsed wave function as if there were a point particle localized at
the collapse site. Then the argument is straightforward: take a quantum particle with
sharp momentum but uncertain position, and scatter a gravity wave off it. The wave
function collapses, producing a localized particle (whose position is determined
by observing the scattered wave), but with uncertain momentum according to the
uncertainty relations. Making the initial particle slow and measuring the scattered
gravity wave with sufficient accuracy, one can pinpoint the final location sharply
enough to ensure that the uncertainty in final momentum is far greater than the sharp
value of the initial momentum. Eppley and Hannah conclude that we have a case of
momentum non-conservation, at least on the grounds that a subsequent momentum
measurement could lead to a far greater value than the initial momentum. (Or
perhaps, if we envision performing the experiment on an ensemble of such particles,
we have no reason to think that the momentum expectation value after will be the
same as before.)
9
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As with the first argument, the first thing that strikes one about this second argu-
ment is that it does not obviously depend on the fact that it is an interaction with
the gravitational field that produces collapse. Identical reasoning could be applied
to any sufficiently high resolution particle detector, given the standard collapse
interpretation of measurement. Since this problem for the collapse interpretation is
rather obvious, we should ask whether it has any standard response. It seems that
it does: as long as the momentum associated with the measuring device is much
greater than the uncertainty it produces, then we can sweep the problem under
the rug. The non-conservation is just not relevant to the measurement undertaken.
If this response works for generic measurements, then we can apply it in partic-
ular to gravitationally induced collapse, leaving Eppley and Hannah’s argument
inconclusive.
But how satisfactory is this response in the generic case? Just as satisfactory as
the basic collapse interpretation: not terribly, we would say. Without rehearsing the
familiar arguments, ‘sweeping quantities under the rug’ in this way seems troublingly
ad hoc, pointing to some missing piece of the quantum puzzle: hidden variables
perhaps or, as we shall consider here, a precise theory of collapse. Without some
such addition to quantum mechanics it is hard to evaluate whether such momentum
non-conservation should be taken seriously or not, but with a more detailed collapse
theory it is possible to pose some determinate questions. Take, as an important
example, the ‘spontaneous localization’ approaches of Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber
(1986) or, more particularly here, of Pearle and Squires (1996). In their models,
energy is indeed not conserved in collapse, but with suitable tuning (essentially
smearing matter over a fundamental scale), the effect can be made to shrink below
anything that might have been detected to date.4
Whether such an answer to non-conservation is satisfactory depends on whether
we must take the postulate of momentum conservation as a fundamental or exper-
imental fact, which in turn depends on our reasons for holding the postulate.
In quantum mechanics, the reasons are of course that the spacetime symmetries
imply that the self-adjoint generators of temporal and spatial translations commute,
[Hˆ , Pˆ] = 0, and the considerations that lead us to identify the generator of spa-
tial transformations with momentum (cf., e.g. Jordan 1969). The conservation law,
d〈Pˆ〉/dt = 0 then follows simply. But of course, implicit in the assumption that
there is a self-adjoint generator for temporal translations, Hˆ , is the assumption that
the evolution operator, Uˆ (t ) = e−iHˆ t/h¯ , is unitary. But in a collapse, it is exactly
this assumption that breaks down: so what Eppley and Hannah in fact show is only
that in a collapse our fundamental reasons for expecting momentum conservation
fail. But if all that remains are our empirical reasons, then the spontaneous localiza-
tion approaches are satisfactory on this issue, as are other collapse models that hide
momentum non-conservation below the limits of observation. Thus, the incom-
pleteness problem aside, sweeping momentum uncertainty under the rug need not
do any harm.5 In this respect, it is worth noting that if gravitational waves cause
quantum jumps, then the effect must depend in some way on the strength of the
waves. The evidence for this assertion is the terrestrial success of quantum mechanics
despite the constant presence on Earth of gravity waves from deep space sources (and
indeed from the motions of local objects). If collapse into states sharp in position
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were occurring at a significant rate then, for instance, we would not expect matter to
be stable, since energy eigenstates are typically not sharp in position, nor would we
observe electron diffraction, since electrons with sharp positions move as localized
particles, without interfering.6
Since the size of the collapse effect must depend on the gravitational field in
some way, one could look for a theory in which the momentum of a gravitational
wave was always much larger than the uncertainty in any collapse it causes. Then any
momentum non-conserving effect would be undetectable, and Eppley and Hannah’s
qualms could again be swept under the rug.
Indeed, the spontaneous localization model developed by Pearle and Squires
(1996) has these features to some degree. They do not explicitly model a collapse
caused by a gravitational wave, but rather use a gravitational field whose source is a
collection of point sources, which punctuate independently in and out of existence.
In their model, the rate at which collapse occurs depends (directly) on the mass of
the sources and (as a square root) on the probability for source creation at any time,
so that a stronger source field produces a stronger gravitational field and a greater
rate of collapse. And the amount of energy produced by collapse is undetectable
by present instruments, given a suitable fixing of constants, sweeping it under the
rug. (Pearle and Squires also argue that the collapse rate is great enough to prevent
signalling.)
Finally, Roger Penrose also links gravity to collapse (see Chapter 13). He in fact
advocates a model in which gravity is quantized, but this is not crucial to the measure
of collapse rate he offers. He proposes that the time rate of collapse of a superposition
of two separated wave packets, T , is determined by the (Newtonian) gravitational
self-energy of the difference of the two packets, E∆: T ∼ h¯/E∆. Penrose also
proposes a test for this model, which Joy Christian criticizes and refines in Chapter 14.
As we said at the start of this section, arguments in the style of Eppley and
Hannah do not constitute no-go theorems against half-and-half theories of quantum
gravity. There are ways to evade both horns of the dilemma: adopting a no-collapse
theory could preclude superluminal signalling in the first horn, and allowing for
unobservable momentum non-conservation makes the result of the second horn
something one could also live with. This particular argument, which is often repeated
in the literature and in conversation, fails. Though we have not shown it, we would
like to here register our skepticism that any argument in the style of Eppley and
Hannah’s could prove that it is inconsistent to have a world that is part quantum
and part classical. Rosenfeld (1963) is right. Empirical considerations must create
the necessity, if there is any, of quantizing the gravitational field.
Even so, the mere possibility of half-and-half theories does not make them attrac-
tive, and aside from their serious attention to the measurement problem, it is
important to emphasize that they have not yielded the kind of powerful new insights
that attract large research communities. Note too that most physicists arguing for
the necessity of quantum gravity do not take the above argument as the main reason
for quantizing the gravitational field. Rather, they usually point to a list of what
one might call methodological points in favour of quantum gravity; see Chapter 2
for one such list. These points typically include various perceived weaknesses in
contemporary theory, and find these sufficiently suggestive of the need for a theory
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wherein gravity is quantized. We have no qualms with this kind of argument, so
long as it is recognized that the need for such a theory is not one of logical or (yet)
empirical necessity.
1.2.2 The semiclassical theory
Finally, we should discuss a specific suggestion for a half-and-half theory due to
Møller (1962) and Rosenfeld (1963), which appears – often as a foil – in the literature
from time to time (see Chapters 2 and 13). This theory, ‘semiclassical quantum
gravity’ (though any half-and-half theory is in some sense semiclassical), postulates
first that the spacetime geometry couples to the expectation value of the stress–energy
tensor:
Gµν = 8π〈Tˆµν〉Ψ. (1.4)
Gµν is the classical Einstein tensor and 〈Tˆµν〉Ψ is the expectation value for the stress–
energy operator given that the quantum state of the matter fields is Ψ. Clearly this
is the most obvious equation to write down given the Einstein field equation of
classical general relativity, and given quantum rather than classical matter: 〈Tµν〉Ψ
is the most obvious ‘classical’ quantity that can be coupled to Gµν .
Now, eqn. 1.4 differs importantly from the classical equation (eqn. 1.1), in that
the latter is supposed to be ‘complete’, coding all matter–space and matter–matter
dynamics: in principle, no other dynamical equations are required. Equation 1.4
cannot be complete in this sense, for it only imposes a relation between the spacetime
geometry and the expectation value of the matter density, but typically many quan-
tum states share any given expectation value. For example, being given the energy
expectation value of some system as a function of time does not, by itself, deter-
mine the evolution of the quantum state (one also needs the standard connection
between the Hamiltonian and the dynamics). So the semiclassical theory requires a
separate specification of the quantum evolution of the matter fields: a Schro¨dinger
equation on a curved spacetime. But this means that semiclassical quantum grav-
ity is governed by an unpleasantly complicated dynamics: one for which we must
seek ‘self-consistent’ solutions to two disparate of motions. Finding a model typi-
cally proceeds by first picking a spacetime – say a Schwarzschild black hole – and
solving the Schro¨dinger equation for the matter fields on the spacetime. But this
ignores the effect of the field on the spacetime, so next one wants to find the stress–
energy tensor for this solution, and plug that into the semiclassical equation, to find
corrections to the original spacetime. But then the assumption of a Schwarzschild
solution no longer holds, and the Schro¨dinger equation must be solved for the
new geometry, giving a new stress–energy expectation value to be fed back into the
semiclassical equation, and so on and so on. What one of course hopes is that this
process converges on a spacetime and matter field that satisfy both equations, but
in the absence of such solutions it is not even clear that the equations are mutually
consistent.
This lack of unity is one reason that physicists by-and-large do not take the
semiclassical theory seriously as a ‘fundamental’ theory. The idea instead is that it
can be used as an heuristic guide to some suggestive results in the absence of a real
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theory of quantum gravity; in the famous case mentioned, ‘Hawking radiation’ is
produced by quantum fields in a Schwarzschild spacetime, and if one could feed
the ‘back reaction’ into the semiclassical equation one would expect to find the
black hole radius decreasing as it evaporated. Unfortunately, a number of technical
problems face even this example, and though research is active and understanding
is increasing, there are still no known interesting solutions with evolving spacetimes
in four dimensions (see Wald 1994 for a discussion).
Things look even worse when one considers the collapse dynamics for quantum
mechanics. On the standard interpretation, the unitary dynamics for a system must
be supplemented with a collapse during certain ‘measurement’ interactions. If the
semiclassical theory were complete, then not only would the unitary evolution of
quantum matter need to be contained in eqn. 1.4, but so would the collapse. But –
turning around an argument of Unruh’s (1984) – it is impossible for eqn. 1.4 to
contain a sharp collapse: the Einstein tensor is necessarily conserved, Gµ;ν
ν = 0,
but a collapse would lead to a discontinuity in the stress–energy expectation value,
〈Tˆµν〉;ν = 0. Nor does it seem plausible that eqn. 1.4 contains a smoother collapse:
why should measuring events invariably produce the appropriate change in Gµν? In
that case, the theory needs to be supplemented with a collapse dynamics, perhaps
along the lines suggested by Pearle and Squires, but certainly constrained by the
arguments considered in Section 1.2.1. In this context one point is worth noting: if
the collapse mechanism is sharp then Unruh’s argument shows either that eqn. 1.4 is
incorrect, or that the LHS is not a tensor field everywhere, but only on local patches
of spacetime, with ‘jumps’ in the field outside the patches.7
Our assessment of the semiclassical theory as a candidate fundamental theory is
much the same as for half-and-half theories in general: while they are not impos-
sible, if one weighs the insights they offer against the epicycles they require for
their maintenance, then they do not appear to be terribly progressive. Certainly
they take seriously the measurement problem, and so address arguments by, for
instance, Penrose (1989) that gravity and collapse are interrelated. And certainly,
the semiclassical theory has provided an invaluable and revealing tool for exploring
the boundary between general relativity and quantum mechanics, yielding a picture
of what phenomena – such as black hole thermodynamics – might be expected of
a theory of quantum gravity. But on the other hand, arguing that half-and-half
theories are fundamental involves more negotiating pitfalls than producing posi-
tive results. Thus it is not surprising that, although half-and-half theories have not
been shown to be inconsistent, they are not the focus of most work in quantum
gravity.
1.3 Approaches to quantum gravity
As we mentioned earlier, there currently is no quantum theory of gravity. There
are, however, some more-or-less developed approaches to the field, of which the
most actively researched fall into one of two broad classes, superstring theory and
canonical quantum gravity. Correspondingly, most of the chapters in this book that
deal explicitly with current research in the field discuss one or the other of these
programmes; thus it will be useful to give here preparatory sketches of both classes.
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(A warning: more space is devoted here to the canonical approach than to string
theory. This does not mirror their relative popularities in the contemporary physics
community, but reflects the greater development of philosophical discussion within
the canonical programme.)
1.3.1 Superstrings
First, superstring theory, which is discussed in Chapters 5, 6, and 7. Superstring
theory seeks to provide a unified quantum theory of all interactions, in which the
elementary entities are one-dimensional extended objects (strings), not point parti-
cles. Superstring theory arose from work on the strong interaction in the late 1960s
and early 1970s when it was shown that all the properties of a certain interest-
ing model of the strong interaction (Veneziano’s model) could be duplicated by a
Lagrangian theory of a relativistic string. Though interesting, this idea did not really
take off. In the mid-1970s, however, it was demonstrated that graviton–graviton
(quanta of the gravitational field) scattering amplitudes were the same as the ampli-
tudes of a certain type of closed string. This fact led to the idea that superstring
theory is a theory of all forces, not only the strong interaction.
Superstrings, consequently, are not meant to represent single particles or single
interactions, but rather they represent the entire spectrum of particles through
their vibrations. In this way, superstring theory promises a novel and attractive
‘ontological unification’. That is, unlike electrons, protons and neutrons – which
together compose atoms – and unlike quarks and gluons – which together compose
protons – strings would not be merely the smallest object in the universe, one from
which other types of matter are composed. Strings would not be merely constituents
of electrons or protons in the same manner as these entities are constituents of atoms.
Rather, strings would be all that there is: electrons, quarks, and so on would simply
be different vibrational modes of a string. In the mid-1980s this idea was taken up
by a number of researchers, who developed a unitary quantum theory of gravity in
ten dimensions.
A sketch of the basic idea is as follows (see Chapters 5 and 6 for more extensive
treatments). Consider a classical one-dimensional string propagating in a relativistic
spacetime, sweeping out a two-dimensional worldsheet, which we can treat as a
manifold with ‘internal’ co-ordinates (σ, τ ). One can give a classical treatment of
this system in which the canonical variables are Xµ(σ, τ ), where Xµ (µ = 0, 1, 2, 3)
are the spacetime co-ordinates of points on the string worldsheet. When the theory is
quantized, this embedding function is treated as a quantum field theory of excitations
on the string, Xˆµ(σ, τ ). A number of fascinating and suggestive properties arise as
necessary consequences of such quantization.
• For instance, it was found that every consistent interacting quantized superstring
theory necessarily includes gravity. That is, closed strings all have gravitons
(massless spin-2 particles) in their excitation spectrum and open strings contain
them as intermediate states.
• In addition, the classical spacetime metric on the background spacetime must
satisfy a version of Einstein’s field equations (plus small perturbations) if we
(plausibly) demand that Xµ(σ, τ ) be conformally invariant on the string. Thus,
arguably, general relativity follows from string theory in the appropriate limit.
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• It is also necessary that the theory be supersymmetric (a symmetry allowing
transformations between bosons and fermions), a property independently
attractive to physicists seeking unified theories.
So part of the motivation for string theory comes from the feeling that it is
almost too good to be a coincidence that the mere requirement of quantizing a
classical string automatically brings with it gravity and supersymmetry. Of course,
another notorious consequence of quantizing a string is that spacetime must have a
dimension n, where n > 4 (n = 26 for the bosonic string, n = 10 when fermions are
added). But even here it can be claimed that the extra spacetime dimensions do not
arise by being put in artificially (as is the case, arguably, in Kaluza–Klein theory).
Rather, they again arise as a necessary condition for consistent quantization.
More recently, since the mid-1990s, string theorists have explored various sym-
metries known as ‘dualities’ in order to find clues to the non-perturbative aspects of
the theory. These dualities, they believe, hint that the five different existing classes of
string theories may in fact just be aspects of an underlying theory sometimes called
‘M-theory’, where ‘M’ = ‘magic’, ‘mystery’, ‘membrane’, or we might add, ‘maybe’. (In
a sense, superstring theory can be seen as returning to its early foundations, since the
ideas of Veneziano were based upon a [different] kind of ‘duality’ in his model of the
strong interaction.) There have been many exciting results along these lines during
the 1990s. These are briefly described in Chapters 2 and 5 (see also Witten 1997).
In addition, important and impressive results concerning the thermodynamics of
black holes have also been derived from the perspective of string theory, and these
are described and discussed in Chapter 7.
It is perhaps legitimate to view the difference between the perturbative superstring
theory of the mid-1980s and the non-perturbative M-theory of 1994–present as the
difference between whether superstring theory is a new fundamental theory or not.
The older superstring theory is, in a sense, not fundamental; quantum mechanics still
was. Superstring theory was ‘just’ quantum mechanics applied to classical strings.
(Of course there was no ‘just’ about it as regards the mathematical and physical
insight needed to devise the theory!) But with today’s string field theory, we see
intimations of a wholly new fundamental theory in the various novel dualities and
non-perturbative results. However, it is still troubling that so much of the success of
string theory derives from the enormous mathematical power and elegance of the
theory, rather than from empirical input. In his article, Weingard draws attention
to this point, arguing that, unlike other theories which turned out to be successful,
such as general relativity, string theory is not based on any obvious physical ‘clues’.
This article was written before the recent developments in M-theory, so we leave it
to the reader to consider whether the situation has changed.
Another issue of philosophical significance, discussed in Chapters 5 and 6, con-
cerns the nature of spacetime according to string theory. The original formulation
of string theory was envisaged as an extension of perturbative quantum field theory
from point particles to strings; thus, as we described earlier, strings were taken to
carry the gravitational field on a flat background spacetime. (Part of the promise
of this approach was that renormalization difficulties are at least rendered more
tractable, and at best do not occur at all.) On this view, then, spacetime appears
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very much as it did classically: we have matter and forces evolving on an ‘absolute’,
non-dynamical manifold. One disadvantage of this approach is easily overcome: as
Witten describes, it is simple to generalize from the assumption of a flat background
by inserting your metric of choice into the Lagrangian for the string field. This obser-
vation, plus the fact that conformal invariance for the field on the string demands
that the Einstein equation be satisfied by the spacetime metric, leads Witten to pro-
pose that we should not see spacetime as an absolute background in string theory
after all. Since spacetime is captured by the field theory on the string, ‘one does not
have to have spacetime any more, except to the extent that one can extract it from a
two-dimensional field theory’. (In Chapter 6, Weingard makes a similar point in his
discussion of the second quantization of string theory.) To support his claim Witten
also describes a duality symmetry of string theory that identifies small circles with
larger circles. The idea is that no circle can be shrunk beneath a certain scale, and so
there is a minimum – quantum – size in spacetime, and so no absolute background
continuum. More on this claim in the final section.
1.3.2 Canonical quantum gravity
In contrast to superstring theory, canonical quantum gravity seeks a non-
perturbative quantum theory of only the gravitational field. It aims for consistency
between quantum mechanics and gravity, not unification of all the different fields.
The main idea is to apply standard quantization procedures to the general theory
of relativity. To apply these procedures, it is necessary to cast general relativity into
canonical (Hamiltonian) form, and then quantize in the usual way. This was (par-
tially) successfully done by Dirac (1964) and (differently) by Arnowitt, Deser, and
Misner (1962). Since it puts relativity into a more familiar form, it makes an other-
wise daunting task seem hard but manageable. In the remainder of this section we
will give an intuitive sketch of the steps involved in this process, but be aware that
many (unsolved) difficulties lie in the way of its successful completion. The reader
should also be warned that we introduce these ideas with an out-of-date formula-
tion of the theory, namely, the geometrodynamical formulation. More sophisticated
and successful formulations exist – notably, the Ashtekar variable and loop variable
approaches – but as these do not by themselves significantly affect the philosophical
issues facing canonical quantum gravity, we here confine ourselves to the simpler
and more intuitive picture.
In the standard Hamiltonian formulation (all this material is covered more fully
in Chapter 10), one starts with canonical variables – say the position, x , and momen-
tum, p, of a particle – which define the appropriate phase space for the system. Given
a point in the phase space – say the instantaneous position and momentum of the
particle – the Hamiltonian, H (x , p), for the system will generate a unique trajectory
with respect to a time parameter. So, to apply this approach to general relativity
the first job is to define the relevant variables. The intuitive picture sought is one in
which a three-dimensional spatial manifold, Σ, evolves through an arbitrary time
parameter τ , so the natural thing is to decompose spacetime into space and time. In
the geometrodynamical formulation, a spatial 3-metric hab(x) on Σ plays the role
of the canonical position, and a canonically conjugate momentum pab(x) is also
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defined (it is closely related to the extrinsic curvature of Σ in the spacetime). The
phase space for this system is thus the space of all possible 3-spaces and conjugate
momenta, so the pair (h, p) fix an instantaneous state of Σ. (It is worth noting
that the foliation of spacetime implied by this procedure is at odds with the central
tenets of general relativity and will be a source of difficulties further down the line.)
Finally, one gives a Hamiltonian that generates trajectories through phase space in
agreement with relativity: trajectories such that the stack of 3-spaces form a model
of Einstein’s field equation.
Canonical quantization of such a system then means (in the first place) finding
an operator representation of the canonical variables obeying the canonical com-
mutation relations, say, [xˆ , pˆ] = ih¯, or in our case [hˆ, pˆ] = ih¯. Usually one hopes
that smooth (wave) functions, ψ(x), on the canonical position space (configuration
space) will carry such a representation (since xˆ = x and pˆ = ih¯ ∂/∂x are opera-
tors on such functions satisfying the commutation relations). One finally obtains
a quantum Hamiltonian operator by replacing the canonical variables in the clas-
sical Hamiltonian with their operator representations: H (x , p) → Hˆ (xˆ , pˆ). States
of the quantum system are of course represented by the wave functions, and evo-
lutions are generated by the quantized Hamiltonian via the Schro¨dinger equation:
Hˆψ = ih¯ ∂ψ/∂t . If all this went through for general relativity, then we would expect
states of quantum gravity to be wave functions ψ(h) over the configuration space of
possible – Riemannian – 3-metrics, Riem(3), and physical quantities including the
canonical variables to be represented as operators on this space.
The general relativistic Hamiltonian generates evolutions in the direction of the
time that parameterizes the stack of 3-spaces, but there is no reason why this should
be normal to any given point on a 3-space. So, if T is a vector (field) in the direction
of increasing stack time in the spacetime, and n is a unit vector (field) everywhere
normal to the 3-spaces, we can decompose T into normal and tangential compo-
nents, T = Nn + N . N is the ‘lapse’ function, coding the normal component of
T , and N is the ‘shift’ vector (field), which is always tangent to the 3-space. Not
surprisingly, when one works through the problem (writing down a Lagrangian,
then using Hamilton’s equations), the Hamiltonian for the system can be split into
parts generating evolutions normal and tangent to the 3-spaces. Added together,
these parts generate transformations in the direction of the time parameter. Thus,
a standard Hamiltonian takes the form (for certain functions, Cµ, of the canonical
variables):
H =
∫
d3x (C · N + N iCi). (1.5)
Variation of h and p yields six of the Einstein equation’s ten equations of motion,
and variation of the N and N produces the so-called ‘Hamiltonian’ and ‘momentum’
constraints’ (which hold at each point in spacetime):
C = Ci = 0. (1.6)
In other words, not every point of our phase space actually corresponds to a
(hypersurface of a) solution of general relativity, but only those for which (h, p)
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satisfy eqn. 1.6: in the formulation general relativity is a constrained Hamiltonian
system. As a consequence of eqn. 1.6, H = 0, though in the classical case at least, this
does not mean that there is no dynamics: the first six equations of motion ensure that
the 3-space geometry varies with time. It does however lead to some deep problems
in the theory, both in the classical and quantum contexts.
The idea of a constraint is of course fairly straightforward: consider, for example, a
free particle moving on a plane with freely specifiable values of position, x and y , and
of momentum, px and py : there are four degrees of freedom. However, if confined
to a circle, x2 + y2 = a, the particle must satisfy the constraint xpx + ypy = 0, which
allows us to solve for one of the variables in terms of the others: the constrained
system has only three degrees of freedom. Pictorially, the unconstrained particle’s
state may be represented anywhere in the four-dimensional phase space spanned
by the two position and two momenta axes, but the constrained particle can only
‘live’ on the three-dimensional subspace – the ‘constraint hypersurface’ – on which
the constraint holds. In this model the simplest way to approach the motion is to
reparameterize the system to three variables in which the constraint is automatically
satisfied: effectively making the constraint hypersurface the phase space.
Now, finding a constraint for a Hamiltonian system often (though not in the pre-
vious toy example) indicates that we are dealing with a gauge theory: there is some
symmetry transformation between states in the phase space that leaves all dynamical
parameters unchanged. The usual understanding is that since any physical quantities
must ‘make a difference’ dynamically, all observables (physically real quantities) must
be gauge invariant. (Note that this is a much stronger notion than a covariant sym-
metry, the idea that transformed quantities, though distinguishable, obey the same
equations of motion.) Such systems are of course fundamental to contemporary
field theory, since imposing local gauge invariance on a field requires introducing
a ‘connection’, A, which allows comparisons of values of the field at infinitesimally
separated points (working as the affine connection to allow differentiation of fields
over spacetime). A acts as a second field in the gauge invariant field equation, medi-
ating interactions; in quantum field theory, the original field represents ‘matter’ and
the connection field represents exchange particles, such as photons (see Redhead
1983). Note however that A is an example of a gauge non-invariant quantity, so
although it is crucial for understanding interactions, it contains unphysical degrees
of freedom. This apparent paradox shows the subtleties involved in understanding
gauge theories.8
We can apply these lessons to the Hamiltonian formulation of general relativity.
The constraint appears to be connected to a symmetry, this time the general covari-
ance of the theory, understood as diffeomorphism invariance. That is, if 〈M , g , T 〉
represents a spacetime of the theory (where M is a manifold, g represents the metric
field and T the matter fields), and D∗ is a smooth invertible mapping on M , then
〈M , D ∗ g , D ∗ T 〉 represents the very same spacetime. Crudely, smooth differences
in how the fields are arranged over the manifold are not physically significant.
It is vital to note that we have already reached the point at which controversial
philosophical stances must be taken. As Belot and Earman explain, to understand
diffeomorphism this way, as a gauge symmetry, is to take a stance on Einstein’s
infamous ‘hole argument’, and hence on various issues concerning the nature of
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spacetime; in turn, these issues will bear on the ‘problem of time’, introduced below.
We will maintain the gauge understanding at this point, since it is fairly conventional
among physicists (as several articles here testify).
Though the matter is subtle, if intuitively plausible, the momentum and
Hamiltonian constraints (eqn. 1.6) are believed to capture the invariance of general
relativity under spacelike and timelike diffeomorphisms respectively (e.g. Unruh and
Wald 1989). As it happens (unlike the toy case) the constraints cause the Hamiltonian
to vanish. This is not atypical of generally covariant Hamiltonian systems (see Belot
and Earman’s discussion of a parametrized free particle in Chapter 10 for an exam-
ple), but what is atypical in this theory is that the Hamiltonian is entirely composed
of constraints.
In fact, since things have been chosen nicely so that the momentum and
Hamiltonian constraints are associated with diffeomorphisms tangent and normal
to the 3-space, Σ, respectively, satisfying the former with a reparameterization is
easy: instead of counting every h on Σ as a distinct possibility, we take only equiv-
alence classes of 3-spaces related by diffeomorphisms to represent distinct states.
This move turns our earlier configuration space into ‘superspace’, so we now want
quantum states to be wave functions over superspace.
Once this move is made, all that is left of the Hamiltonian is the Hamiltonian con-
straint. But now a reparameterization seems out of the question, for the Hamiltonian
constraint is related to diffeomorphisms in the time direction. If we try to form a
state space in which all states related by temporal diffeomorphisms are counted as
the same, then we have no choice but to treat whole spacetimes, not just 3-spaces,
as states. Otherwise it just makes no sense to pose the question of whether the two
states are related by the diffeomorphism. But in this case the state space consists, not
of 3-geometries, but of full solutions of general relativity. And in this case there are
no trajectories of evolving solutions, and the Hamiltonian and Schro¨dinger pictures
no longer apply.
Despite this difficulty, it is still possible to quantize our system by (more or less)
following Dirac’s quantization scheme and requiring that the constraint equations
be satisfied as operator equations, heuristically writing:
CˆΨ = Cˆ iΨ = 0. (1.7)
Since the momentum constraints are automatically satisfied in superspace, the focus
in canonical quantum gravity is on
CˆΨ = 0, (1.8)
the so-called Wheeler–DeWitt equation. This equation’s interpretation has generated
much controversy, as we shall describe in the next section. For now, be aware that
very significant conceptual and formal difficulties confront the intuitive picture
we have sketched: not least that there are no known solutions to the problem as
constructed so far!9 There are, however, some solutions to this equation when one
writes the theory in terms of Ashtekar’s so-called ‘new variables’. These variables have
overcome many technical obstacles to the older canonical theory, and have greatly
reinvigorated the canonical programme in the past decade (see Rovelli 1998b for a
review).
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Finally, and extremely speculatively, we note that both superstring theory and
the canonical programme have evolved greatly from their initial formulations, and,
as far as we are aware, it is possible that they are converging in some way: for
example, perhaps some descendent of the Ashtekar formulation will turn out to be
a realization of M-theory. That is, the future may reveal an analogy between the
historical developments of quantum gravity and the Schro¨dinger and Heisenberg
formulations of quantum mechanics. Were this to be the case, then one would
expect fruitful new insights into all the issues raised here.
1.4 What quantum gravity and philosophy have to say to each other
Quantum gravity raises a multitude of issues interesting to philosophically minded
thinkers. Physicists working in the field challenge some of our deepest assumptions
about the world, and the philosophical tradition has a strong interest in many of
these assumptions. In this final section we will describe a variety of topics in the
subject that are of mutual concern to physicists and philosophers: some issues that
bear on historically philosophical questions, and some new foundational issues. Our
aim is to give philosophers a good outline of the problems that define the field, and
to give physicists a sketch of how philosophers have investigated such issues – and
of course to show how the arguments of our contributors fit into a broad dialogue
concerning the foundations of quantum gravity. (Note that the papers are not exactly
organized according to the following scheme, because many of them address several
distinct issues.)
1.4.1 The demise of classical spacetime
• A number of the contributors make comments relevant to the ‘fate of spacetime’
in the quantum regime. Since we have already mentioned Witten’s views, we will
start there. He claims that, despite the original idea of strings propagating on a
fixed background spacetime, spacetime arises entirely from the more fundamental
two-dimensional conformal field on the string (an argument supported by duality
symmetry). If correct (and if string theory is correct), then this view constitutes a
considerable advance on our philosophical understanding of the nature of space.
Views on the nature of space are as old as the idea of a general account of motion
(see Huggett 1999): Plato and Descartes believed that matter and space were iden-
tical; Aristotle and other plenists often denied the existence of space by denying
the vacuum of the atomists; and of course Newton and Leibniz were in famous
opposition on the question of whether space was ‘absolute’ or ‘relative’. The recent
philosophical tradition (Friedman 1983 is especially influential here) has divided
this question up in a number of ways: whether spacetime is dynamical or not;
whether there is literally a manifold of points distinct from matter; and the mean-
ing of ‘relativity principles’ as symmetries. Naturally, postgeneral relativity the
answer to the first question is affirmative (though not without subtleties), but the
other two topics are addressed by quantum gravity; the nature of the symmetries
will come up later, for now we see the claim that in string theory spacetime is not
distinct from matter (i.e. strings) but derives from it. The physical argument seems
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pretty straightforward, and it seems to us that philosophers should pick up this
challenge: does Witten offer a sound answer to the problem of the nature of space,
and how does it fit with historical proposals?
One oddity with this view is worth mentioning at once: the spacetime metric
field that appears in the stringy Lagrangian must apparently be defined everywhere,
not just on those points which the string occupies. Witten’s spacetime seems to
exist where matter and hence the fundamental two-dimensional field does not, so
does it truely fade away?
• Canonical quantum gravity also has implications for the nature of spacetime,
raised here by John Baez and Carlo Rovelli in Chapters 8 and 4 respectively. At
first, it might seem that this approach should diverge from that of Witten by
postulating a manifold as distinct from matter as that of general relativity, though
subject to quantum effects: quantum spacetime should be to quantum matter as
classical spacetime is to classical matter. However, as we shall mention below, it
seems unlikely that canonical quantum gravity can be formulated in the space
of 3-metrics as suggested earlier, and the significant advances in the theory of
the last fifteen years have come from the ‘loop’ formulation due, inter alia, to
Ashtekar, Rovelli, and Smolin, introduced here by Rovelli as a logical development
of the insights of general relativity and quantum mechanics. The idea is that
quantum gravity has as a basis (of quantum states) networks with spins values
( 12 , 1,
3
2 . . . ) associated with the vertices. The picture may not seem intuitive, but
if the nodes represent quantized regions, then suitable operators for geometrical
quantities, such as volume, can be found, and so an understanding of the spacetime
represented by such a state attained. (What is unknown at present is how the theory
relates to general relativity in a classical limit.) If the loop basis is not unitarily
equivalent to the 3-metric basis then (if it is correct) it too offers a picture in which
spacetime is not fundamental, but a result of a more basic reality: in this case the
spin network. Rovelli, in Chapter 4, claims that this too is a form of relationism.
• A closely related question is raised in Chapter 8 by Baez in his discussion of
‘topological quantum field theory’. This is an approach to quantum gravity that
gets away from a background spacetime by utilizing an analogy – brought out in
‘category theory’ – between the topological properties of a space and the quantum
formalism. This enables one to construct models of quantum evolutions, involving
topological change, satisfying a set of appropriate axioms, without worrying about
the details of the dynamics of (quantum) geometry. The analogy is very suggestive,
and may be a clue to uniting quantum mechanics and general relativity, but it
comes at a price: the spacetimes in the theory have no local properties, such
as a metric or causal structure, and so the theory cannot be the whole story.
As Baez mentions, the ideas have been useful in canonical quantum gravity to
study the dynamics in analogy to the Feynman approach of quantum field theory:
one calculates sums over ways in which surfaces can interact by branching and
joining – ‘spin foams’.
An important philosophical question brought up here is how the causal structure
of spacetime is to be built into this kind of theory. Causation is a perennial topic
for philosophers: from Aristotle, to Hume and his sceptical descendants, who
claim that causation is just ‘constant conjunction’ of some kind; to contemporary
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accounts in subjunctive terms – ‘A caused B just in case if A had not happened then
neither would B have happened’ – or based on statistical considerations; to the
understanding of causal structure in relativity. Apparently this is not a topic that is
well understood in quantum gravity, but it is one that philosophers should address.
Another question of philosophical interest here concerns the topology change that
is the basis of the theory. Philosophers have rarely considered the exotic possibility
of the topology of space changing with time, but it is a possibility with relevance
to some traditional philosophical issues, for example Aristotle’s, Descartes’, and
Kant’s claimed ‘unity of space’ (see Callender and Weingard 2000).
• As we have just indicated, the fate of spacetime in many approaches to the sub-
ject is that classical spacetime structure (loosely, a semi-Riemannian metric on a
continuous manifold) breaks down. In Chapter 2, Butterfield and Isham treat at
greater length the consequences of the various programmes and speculations for
the notion of spacetime. Common to these programmes and speculations is talk
of the gravitational field in quantum gravity ‘fluctuating’. But can this really make
sense? In Chapter 3, Weinstein (a philosopher) takes this naive idea seriously, to
see whether it can really hold water. He argues that it cannot without the theory
failing to capture all observable gravitational phenomena. The main idea behind
some of his critique is that fluctuations in the gravitational field imply fluctuations
in the spatiotemporal, and hence causal, structure of the world. But it is hard to see
how one can make sense of canonical commutation relations and hence quantize
anything in the absence of a stable causal structure.
1.4.2 The nature of time
• Next, consider what is possibly the deepest of all philosophical puzzles, the nature
of time (see, e.g. Le Poidevin and MacBeath 1993). Not only do certain programmes
imply the breakdown of classical spacetime structure, but they also threaten to say
something ‘special’ about time. Indeed, quantum gravity in all of its formulations
seems forced to say something novel about this subject, for it must reconcile
a conflict in the understanding of time between quantum theory and general
relativity. Canonical quantum mechanics, since it is based on the Hamiltonian
formulation, describes systems evolving with respect to a time parameter: either
the preferred foliation of Galilean spacetime or – covariantly – the instantaneous
hypersurfaces of an inertial frame. But general relativity is famously hostile to any
such time parametrization (except in very special cases with nice symmetries). First
of all, there is no such thing as time, simpliciter, in the theory, but rather a variety
of time variables. There is the completely arbitrary co-ordinate time which, unlike
time in Minkowski spacetime, has no metrical properties. There is also the proper
time of an observer, but this cannot be extrapolated out to be the unique measure
of time for all observers. And then there are various ‘cosmic time’ variables, such as
Weyl’s and Milne’s definitions of cosmic time, though these are usually dependent
upon special distributions of matter–energy or on special geometrical properties
of the spacetime holding. In general relativity, there are plenty of cosmological
solutions that do not even allow the possibility of spacetime being foliated by
global spacelike hypersurfaces. Finally, the spacetime metric is dynamical in general
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relativity but non-dynamical in quantum mechanics. Thus, the two conceptions
of time are very different. Quantum gravity, therefore, must say something about
time, even if only that one of these two conceptions is fundamentally correct and
the other only approximately right. Its verdict on this issue and others like it will
be of interest to philosophers and physicists alike. In Chapter 2, Butterfield and
Isham survey this problem (among others) and explain what some of the major
programmes suggest is right.
• Some more specific problems connected with time arise in canonical quantum
gravity. First, there is the notorious ‘problem of time’. Since Belot and Earman
discuss this in detail in Chapter 10, we will only briefly mention the problem. The
problem is obvious enough: the Wheeler–DeWitt equation has no time depen-
dence! Like a particle in a (non-degenerate) eigenstate of zero energy, the quantum
state of the universe does not change, contrary to experience. (Note that this prob-
lem does not affect the classical theory: in that context a spacetime can evolve
even if its Hamiltonian vanishes. It is only when we follow Dirac’s prescription
for the quantum interpretation of the constraints that trouble strikes.) Further,
since the Wheeler–DeWitt equation must hold at all times, it holds before and
after measurements. Thus there is no way to encode the information gained from
a measurement back into the equation, which aggravates the first problem.
• Then, there is the related problem of observables. As we explained above, the
natural interpretation of a gauge theory is that the gauge degrees of freedom
do not correspond to physical transformations, and thus one concludes that all
observable quantities must be gauge invariant, unchanged under the action of the
gauge transformations (actually this is what is usually meant by a gauge symmetry).
In formal terms this means classically that the Poisson bracket of any constraint and
observable vanishes, {C , O} = 0; on quantizing according to the Dirac scheme,
the operators corresponding to the constraint and observable must commute,
[Cˆ , Oˆ] = 0. Now in general relativity we find that the Hamiltonian, H , which is
supposed to generate evolutions is itself a constraint, and so commutes with any
observable; but {H , O} = 0 and [Hˆ , Oˆ] = 0 mean that any observable quantity
(its value or expectation value) is a constant of the motion. Equivalently, since the
two parts of the Hamiltonian generate diffeomorphisms, all physical quantities
must be diffeomorphism invariant. As a rule, constants of the motion tend to be
pretty dull physical quantities. In fact, if Σ is compact, the system has no known
observables; if Σ is open, then trivial quantities may be defined, but they are
generally acknowledged to be useless to quantum gravity. In particular, since the
spatial 3-metric presumably changes with time, it cannot be an observable (which
leaves one wondering what the point is of promoting it to an operator). Of course
this flies in the face of the conventional understanding of general relativity, which
holds that the metric is observable.
Note that although the problem described afflicts both classical and quantum
versions of the theory, it raises an additional conflict between quantum general
relativity and the usual interpretation of quantum mechanics. Any quantum
mechanical observable with time-dependent values will satisfy [Hˆ , Qˆ] = 0, which
means that there are no simultaneous eigenstates of Hˆ and Qˆ. But since H is a con-
straint, the fundamental postulate of Dirac’s quantization is that every state of the
23
[10:14 2000/10/5 g:/tex/key-tex/callendr/3663-001.tex] Ref: 3663 CALLENDER: Physics Meets Philosophy Chapter 1 Page: 24 1–30
Craig Callender and Nick Huggett
system is an eigenstate of Hˆ : HˆΨ = 0. But then no possible states are eigenstates of
such a Qˆ, and so the usual account of quantum measurement breaks down: there
simply cannot be a collapse into a state of definite Q if no such states exist!
Proposed solutions to these problems are compared and evaluated in detail by
Belot and Earman in Chapter 10, and we think they are only half-joking when
they divide them into ‘Parmenidean’ and ‘Hericlitean’ kinds. Parmenides (later
followed by the more familiar Zeno) argued that all change was illusion, and the
view associated with Rovelli (intimated in Chapter 4, but outlined more fully in
Chapter 10 by Belot and Earman) has this character. According to Rovelli, all
physical quantities are irreducibly relational, and hence timeless: for example, ‘the
clock read one as the mouse ran down’ is a physical property, but it is not analysable
into ‘(at t the clock read one) and (at t the mouse ran down)’, since readings and
positions at t are not physical. The idea of course is to bite the bullet, and accept that
only diffeomorphism invariant quantities are physical, so there are only timeless
truths.
Heraclites, on the other hand, argued for permanent flux, and the views pro-
posed by Kucharˇ (e.g. 1992), among others, have this character. In the more
extreme formulations they go against the spirit of general relativity and assume a
preferred foliation, which gives physical significance to observable quantities that
are time-specific. Kucharˇ’s proposal is more subtle, seeking to find a meaningful
time-parameter without violating the spirit of general relativity, but strong enough
to deny that the scalar constraint has the same force as the vector constraint: quan-
tities should be invariant under spatial diffeomorphisms, but not under timelike
diffeomorphisms.
We would speculate that the problem of change is perhaps the oldest philosoph-
ical subject, and its solutions are the source of many metaphysical problems. The
oldest version asks how change is possible at all: if A changes, then it is no longer the
same, and hence no longer A, so A has not changed, but ceased to exist! In recent
years the problem has been most focussed on the nature of identity – especially the
nature of persistence through time – and the meaning of the spacetime view of the
world: are all truths ‘tenseless’, or is some sense to be made of a ‘specious present’
(see Le Poidevin and MacBeath 1993 and references therein; Williams 1951 is an
enjoyable classic article on this topic). Clearly, the views of Rovelli and Kucharˇ have
crucial bearing on these arguments, and must be taken seriously by philosophers
of time, though, as Belot and Earman point out in Chapter 10 , which (if either)
of their insights is correct is something to be determined in part by the success of
their approaches in solving physical problems.
1.4.3 The interpretation of general relativity
• Since diffeomorphism invariance is the symmetry underlying general relativity’s
general covariance, the interpretation of general covariance – a hotly disputed
topic since the theory’s inception – may be relevant to solving some of the above
problems. Indeed, as many of the chapters in this volume make abundantly clear
(especially Chapters 9 and 10), there most certainly is a connection between issues
in quantum gravity and the interpretation of general covariance, and in particular,
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Einstein’s famous hole argument, which itself bears on the relational–substantival
debate concerning space. In recent years this argument has attracted a great deal
of attention among philosophers. Earman and Norton (1987) argued that the
example shows that the ‘manifold substantivalist’ – one committed to the literal
existence of a spacetime manifold distinct from matter – had to accept radical
indeterminism: there are infinitely many models of general relativity that agree
outside the hole, but disagree inside. Put another way (as Belot and Earman
suggest in Chapter 10), the substantivalist must accept that the points of two
manifolds can be compared, independently of the various fields on them; that is
the meaning of their distinctness from matter. Substantivalists have replied in a
variety of ways, some by arguing that while the comparison can be made without
regard to matter fields, it cannot be made without regard for the metric field, others
use the developments in our understanding of the logic of possibility to argue
that diffeomorphism invariance is compatible with substantivalism. Since one’s
preferred solution to the problem of time bears on the meaning of diffeomorphism
invariance, it is only natural to expect that it will have bearing on the hole argument
and hence the nature of spacetime. (Looked at from another angle, as Belot and
Earman again point out, the issues here are a very special case of the philosophical
issues that arise in understanding gauge degrees of freedom, which are at once
unphysical, but also seemingly essential for modern field theories. See also Redhead
1975.)
• Another issue, raised by Penrose in Chapter 13, suggests that there are problems
with approaches in which there are quantum superpositions of spacetime, as, for
instance, there would be in the intuitive approach to canonical quantum gravity we
sketched in Section 1.3 (though it is less clear what to say about the loop approach).
Penrose points out that general relativity’s principle of general covariance seems
at odds with the quantum mechanical principle of superposition. For suppose
|α〉 = |φ(x)〉|Ψ〉 represents a state in which a particle is localized in a spacetime
with a sharp metric, and |β〉 = |φ(x + a)〉|Ψ′〉 represents the particle shifted
and the appropriate new metric eigenstate. Now, we can imagine the state |α〉 +
|β〉 representing an entangled system involving particle and gravitational field
superpositions. Certainly such a state is distinct from either |α〉 or |β〉, but how can
these two states be distinct? Since the particles only differ by a displacement, we can
suppose the metrics to as well, and so the spacetimes involved are diffeomorphic:
given (one reading of) general covariance the two spacetimes and hence quantum
states are one and the same.
In Chapter 9, Julian Barbour tackles this issue (and the preceding one), arguing
that there is a canonical way to identify points between slightly differing spacetimes;
the key insight, he thinks, comes from a method of deducing the ‘best match’
between one relative configuration of particles and another. In the case of 3-
geometries he claims this method is simply Hilbert’s variational principle. This
idea traces its origins to work in mechanics by Lagrange, Lange, and Mach, among
others, and it has relevance to Machianism about spacetime and the hole argument.
• It is often thought that only quantum mechanics has a problem of interpretation.
However, the above issues and others make it plausible that even general relativ-
ity has a problem of interpretation. The interpretation of general relativity is of
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obvious importance to quantum gravity: it is important to understand properly
the assumptions that go into relativity so that one can better appreciate what one
can and cannot give up when creating a new theory. In this spirit, in Chapter 11
Harvey Brown and Oliver Pooley examine John S. Bell’s (1976) paper ‘How to
Teach Special Relativity’, and apply the lesson they learn from it regarding special
relativity to general relativity. Bell’s paper explains the Lorentz transformations
dynamically a` la Lorentz: by showing how they can be derived from the structure
of matter (in particular from electrodynamics) in relative motion. Einstein related
this explanation of relativity to his own account, as kinetic theory explanations
(so-called ‘constructive theory’ explanations) relate to thermodynamical explana-
tions (so-called ‘principle theory’ explanations). Like Bell, Einstein claimed that
Lorentz’s constructive explanation was necessary for a proper understanding of
special relativity. Brown and Pooley seek to extend this point to general relativity.
They claim it clarifies the role of kinematics and dynamics in special and general
relativity, as well as the role of rods and clocks in the two theories.
1.4.4 The interpretation of quantum mechanics
• Another connection between philosophy and quantum gravity involves the notori-
ous measurement problem in quantummechanics. Physicists and philosophers of
science have both devoted much time and energy to discussing this topic. Is the
measurement problem and the interpretation of quantum mechanics relevant to
quantum gravity? In this volume we are fortunate enough to have sharply divided
answers to this controversial question. In Chapter 4, Rovelli emphatically claims
that there is no connection between the two, whereas SheldonGoldstein and Stefan
Teufel inChapter 12 claim that the connectionmakes all the difference in theworld,
and that the failure to acknowledge it is responsible for many of the conceptual
problems in the field, such as the problem of time.
• The Bohmian approach, here advocated by Goldstein and Teufel, also falls under
this heading. In the case of particle quantum mechanics, Bohm’s theory describes
point bodies – ‘beables’ – whose definite motions are determined by their collec-
tive locations (not momentum) and the wave function, which is itself determined
by the ordinary Schro¨dinger equation (not the particle locations). Goldstein and
Teufel explain in Chapter 12 how this picture can be carried over to canonical
quantum gravity, where the evolution of a definite 3-geometry – the beable – is
determined by a wave function, which is itself determined by theWheeler–DeWitt
equation. This time, since the wave function is not representing the physical state
but, as it were, driving the 3-geometry, the problem of time does not arise: there
is no inconsistency in a stationary wave function leading to an evolving spacetime
in this theory. Further, in Bohmian mechanics the usual quantum formalism for
observables is not taken as a matter of fundamental postulate, but rather should
emerge from analysis of experiments within the framework. In this case the prob-
lem of observables cannot get off the ground: whatever quantities can be shown
to be measurable in experiment are observable. Finally, since physical quantities
come directly from the beables, not the wave function, and since in a model of
Bohmian quantum gravity there is only one stationary wave function, it also seems
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that the need for an inner product is moot: the theory simply sidesteps one of the
hardest technical problems of canonical quantum gravity (explained below). On
the downside, despite many interesting applications of Bohmian quantum gravity
to conceptual and physical problems – for example to the problem of time by
Holland (1993), Callender and Weingard (1994, 1996), and many others; to black
holes by Kenmoku et al. (1997); to the initial singularity by Callender and Wein-
gard (1995); and to various cosmological models by Blaut and Kowalski-Glikman
(1996) – Bohmian quantum gravity has not been developed as seriously as some
other approaches, so it is difficult to say whether or not it has hard problems of
its own.
• In Chapters 13 and 14, Roger Penrose and Joy Christian also see a connection
between gravity and the measurement problem. Penrose develops the attractive
idea that the gravitational field can be drafted in to help answer the measurement
problem. The idea is that the gravitational field is the ‘trigger’ that stimulates col-
lapses of quantum superpositions before they become macroscopic. In principle,
this interpretation should give slightly (though currently unobserved) different
results than standard quantum mechanics. We therefore have the exciting possi-
bility of testing this collapse theory against the standard theory. Penrose, here and
elsewhere, proposes some such experiments. But will they really succeed in testing
his theory? Christian claims that one type of experiment will not work and pro-
poses some others in its place, as well as greatly elaborating the conceptual position
of Penrose’s model within quantum gravity.
• Issues analogous to those concerning collapses arise from Hawking’s (1974) cel-
ebrated results concerning the ‘evaporation’ of black holes (the most important
achievement of the semiclassical theory). In a non-unitary wave function col-
lapse, information about the prior state must be erased: one cannot invert the
dynamics to reconstruct the original wave function. Similarly, information about
a system’s state falls into a black hole with the system, but – on the standard
treatment – is neither contained in the thermal radiation given off as the black
hole evaporates away nor in the black hole itself. Like measurement, it is hard to
reconcile this ‘information loss’ with the unitary evolution required by quantum
mechanics.
In Chapter 7, Unruh explains the ideas of black hole thermodynamics, and
especially the significance of black hole entropy. He also uses an ingenious parallel
between light transmission in spacetime and sound transmission in moving water
(if a black hole is a region from which light cannot escape, then a ‘dumb hole’ is
a region from which sound cannot escape, for instance because the water inside is
moving in the opposite direction supersonically) to show that Hawking’s result is
insensitive to short length scale physics. However, it is such short length physics,
and in particular string theory, that may offer a solution to the information loss
problem according to recent proposals.
First of all, one can (in some very special cases) calculate a ‘traditional’ entropy
for a black hole by counting the number of corresponding (in a loose sense) string
states and taking their logarithm; the result is (in those special cases) in agreement
with the Hawking-style calculation. This raises the possibility that the information
about systems which fall into the black hole is in fact contained in the strings.
27
[10:14 2000/10/5 g:/tex/key-tex/callendr/3663-001.tex] Ref: 3663 CALLENDER: Physics Meets Philosophy Chapter 1 Page: 28 1–30
Craig Callender and Nick Huggett
That is, knowing the details of the thermal radiation and the exact string state
might suffice to reconstruct the in-falling state, as knowledge of the radiation and
internal state of a hot poker would allow resconstruction of the heating process.
Unruh criticizes this proposal, arguing that if the strings are inside the black hole
then they cannot influence the thermal radiation in the appropriate way, but if they
are outside the black hole then they cannot be suitably affected by the in-falling
system. The only possiblity seems to be some kind of non-local interaction between
strings inside and outside the hole, but this scenario is deeply unappealing.
1.4.5 The status of the wave function
• Another topic of interest to both physicists and philosophers concerns the status of
quantum cosmology. Quantum cosmology, in contrast to quantum gravity, aims
to provide a rationale for a particular choice of boundary conditions for our uni-
verse. The most familiar schemes of this kind are the famous Hartle and Hawking
(1983) No-Boundary Proposal and the Vilenkin (1982) initial wave function of the
universe. Some physicists conceive of quantum cosmology as a prescriptive enter-
prise: they believe that there are laws of quantum cosmology. Hawking, Hartle,
and Vilenkin are all engaged in what we might call ‘cosmogenic’ theories. They are
trying to find laws that uniquely determine the initial conditions of the universe.
But is this search scientifically respectable? What possible justification could there
be for the choice of a particular boundary condition – aside from the fact that it
works, i.e. that it leads to what we observe? Any inductive inference from a single
case is unwarranted, so how can we scientifically justify talk of laws and causes for
the universe as a whole? While none of the contributors addresses this question
directly, Goldstein and Teufel in Chapter 12 do speculate about the meaning of the
universal wave function. And these considerations do raise the question of whether
the usual probabilistic interpretation of the wave function can be carried over to
the case of the universal wave function.
• Related problems arise in particular approaches to quantum gravity. To give an
example, consider the problem of the interpretation of the Wheeler–DeWitt equa-
tion (eqn. 1.8). The naive suggestion is that it receive the same interpretation as
does quantum mechanics. (By interpretation we here mean only rules for extract-
ing predictions, not a solution to the measurement problem; until we know how
to extract predictions from the theory it doesn’t even have the luxury of having
a measurement problem!) The naive interpretation would be to think of Ψ(h, p)
as a probability, which when squared yields the probability that an observer will
measure the values h and p. Even putting aside the question of where this observer
of the whole universe is, we know this scheme cannot work (at least straightfor-
wardly). This can be seen by comparing the Wheeler–DeWitt equation to the more
familiar Klein–Gordon equation. If we impose the Klein–Gordon Hamiltonian as
a restriction on the space of physical states, then the analogy between the result-
ing equation and the Wheeler–DeWitt equation is very strong. In fact, when the
Wheeler–DeWitt equation is reduced to two degrees of freedom, it is this resulting
equation. Now recall that the Klein–Gordon equation suffers from a very serious
problem: its inner product 〈Ψ1|Ψ2〉 is not positive definite and therefore cannot be
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used to define a probability. Thus we have a problem with defining a sensible inner
product for the position representation (see, e.g. Teller 1995). The same problem
threatens here, and is one motivation for loop quantization, for one can define an
inner product on the space of 3-metrics in that approach.
The first sections of this introduction sought to clarify the motivations for the
search for a theory of quantum gravity and give a useful outline of the two major
programmes. In this final section we provided a sketch of many (but surely not all)
of the major philosophical dimensions of quantum gravity. We hope that the reader,
equipped with these ideas will now have sufficient context to tackle the chapters of
this book, seeing how they relate to the broad physical and philosophical issues that
surround the topic; if so, he or she will surely find them as exciting and illuminating
as we have. We look forward to the debates that they will spark!
Notes
Many thanks to John Baez, Jossi Berkovitz, Jeremy Butterfield, Carl Hoefer, Tom Imbo,
Jeffrey Ketland and Carlo Rovelli for indispensable comments on this introduction. Portions
of the Introduction are based on ‘Why Quantize Gravity (or Any Other Field for that Matter)?’,
presented at the Philosophy of Science Association Conference (Callender and Huggett 2001).
1. In fact, it is these assumptions of classicality that do the work in the argument; the fact that the
field of interest is not just classical, but also gravitational, does not play a role.
2. Obviously this thought experiment relies on some extreme idealizations, since we in effect
postulate that the electron is screened off from all other fields so that no correlations are lost.
But this does not detract from the point of the example: superluminal signalling that picks out
a preferred foliation of spacetime must be impossible in principle, not just practice, if we take
relativity seriously and literally.
3. A couple of other comments: (a) If Lefty found her box empty then Righty would still measure
an effect, providing that the scattering is sensitive to the amplitude of the wave function (if
not, one could still arrange signalling either by using enough boxes to ensure that Lefty will
find an electron in one, or by using one of the other schemes mentioned above); (b) As
Aharanov and Vaidman (1993) point out, this kind of arrangement will not permit signalling
with their ‘protective observations’, though they are similar in allowing measurements of the
wave function without collapse.
4. Of course, one might be concerned that such ad hoc fine-tuning of parameters is an indication
that we are reaching a ‘degenerating’ phase of the spontaneous localization program, adding
epicycles to save the theory. But this judgement may be premature: Pearle and Squires (1996)
suggest how some such parameters may be derived.
5. Alternately, one might try to maintain momentum conservation on average (as Brown and
Redhead 1981, footnote 21, suggest) in collapses. That is, one could seek to complete the
collapse dynamics of QM in such a way that the expectation value for momentum was always
conserved.
6. If gravitational waves do cause quantum jumps, then a wave empinging on the Earth could
clearly have disastrous consequences if it were sufficiently powerful to collapse every piece of
matter!
7. One issue that has captured a great deal of attention in the semiclassical theory is the so-called
‘loss of information’ problem (e.g. Belot, Earman, and Ruetsche 1999): as the black hole
evaporates away, there is a transition from a pure to mixed state for the matter fields,
reminiscent of the collapse in measurement. While this has worried many, it is not really so
surprising given what we have been saying: no unitary evolution can produce such a
transition, but in the model one is effectively invoking eqn. 1.4 as a second – non-unitary –
equation of motion. It is really just another reflection of the point that in a half-and-half
approach, one must be careful about how to include collapses.
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8. So too does comparison with our toy example of a constraint. For instance, if one takes
electromagnetism written in terms of the gauge potential A, and attempts to remove the
unphysical degrees of freedom by reparameterizing with gauge invariant quantities, such as
the magnetic field, B = ∇× A, one introduces non-locality into the theory (as shown by the
notorious Aharonov–Bohm effect).
9. We should point out that there are reasons to wonder whether this intuitive picture of
3-metrics evolving on superspace is anything other than a metaphor. The 3-metric does not
weave its path between Cauchy hypersurfaces like point particles in classical dynamics do.
Wheeler’s so-called ‘Thick Sandwich’ conjecture is false: that given any two 3-metrics in
superspace there exists a spacetime between them such that they arise as induced metrics on
two disjoint Cauchy surfaces. Different foliations between the two surfaces changes the curve
between them. And even the Thin Sandwich conjecture – that given a point and tangent vector
in superspace, there is a unique spacetime realizing the initial condition – has only limited
applicability. See Bartnik and Fodor (1993) for more.
On the positive side, note that Christian (1997) shows how to exactly quantize a simpler
spacetime theory – Newton–Cartan theory – along these lines.
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